The e ectiveness of an access control mechanism in implementing a security policy in a centralised operating system is often weakened because of the large number of possible access rights involved, informal speci cation of security policy and a lack of tools for assisting systems administrators. Herein we present a logical foundation for automated tools that assist in determining which access rights should be granted by reasoning about the e ects of an access control mechanism on the computations performed by an operating system. We demonstrate the practicality and utility of our logical approach b y s h o wing how i t a l l o ws us to construct a deductive database capable of answering questions about the security o f t wo real-world operating systems. We illustrate the application of our techniques by presenting the results of an experiment designed to assess how accurately the con guration of an access control mechanism implements a given security policy.
Introduction
The access control mechanism in a multi-user operating system provides one of the most important security measures employed in commercial environments. However, in practice, access control mechanisms often prove unreliable for enforcing security, because either the requirements are not formally speci ed or the number of possible access rights is too large for the systems administrator to cope with in the absence of automated tools to determine which access rights should be granted 21] . There are three issues to consider:
The speci cation of security, without which we cannot verify the security a orded by an access control mechanism any more than we c a n talk about the correctness of a program. Speci cation schemes that pertain speci cally to access control have been studied elsewhere, notably in 8] and 24] The con guration of the access control mechanism of an operating system, which m a y i n volve a large set of objects, such as les and directories, and support many users. Real-world evidence suggests that serious security a ws occur because of errors or omissions made at this level. The primary focus of this paper is to investigate the ability to describe and reason about the implementation of a real-world access control mechanism Whether the state of an access control mechanism meets the requirements of an abstract security policy. In Section 6 we present the results of an experiment designed to assess how accurately a con guration of an access control mechanism implements a given security policy.
The context for our work is multi-user centralised operating systems with discretionary access control mechanisms which support complex applications whose functions and data should only be made available to users in a controlled manner. In contrast, many computers support storage and processing of personal or public data for which access control decisions are straightforward. Such cases are not the primary motivation for our work. In this paper we describe a new application of modal logic that provides a formal foundation for automated tools that assist in determining which access rights should be granted. Our logic assists in reasoning about the e ects of an access control mechanism on the computations performed by an operating system. This makes it possible for the systems administrator of a large computer system, where the numb e r o f a c c e s s r i g h ts is overwhelming, to answer some hitherto impractical but important questions, such a s :
can an access right b e r e v oked without reducing the functionality of the system and availability of information to users? have all of the access rights needed by a computation been granted, and does granting any such access right h a ve an unforeseen e ect that compromises the con dentiality o r i n tegrity of the information in the system? Our logic employs a formal model of an access control matrix, as found for example in the seminal papers of Bell-LaPadula 2], Lampson 11] and Harrison et al. 7 ] . In 2] a model is developed for multilevel secure systems, and an implementation of a security policy that ensures con dentiality o f information in such a system is described. In 11] Lampson developed a model of a discretionary access control mechanism based on a protection matrix, and in 7] Harrison et al. established complexity results for the safety problem -that is, given a con guration of an arbitrary protection system (modelled as a protection matrix), can a subject acquire a particular access right. While all of these papers inform our work and basic model, our concern is to demonstrate methods that we have d e v eloped for reasoning about how primitive access rights and dependencies between them may a ect the operation and security o f a r e a l -w orld system.
We regard a computation as a nite set of invocations of access rights all of which must be granted by the access control mechanism for the computation to complete successfully. A computation is initiated by a request -an event that occurs at the Trusted Computing Base boundary 27] -which i s c haracterised by a unique access right.
Some access rights may b e i n voked in some, but not in all instances of a given request because, for example, of conditional statements in a program. Herein we use the modal logic system S5, which deals with possibility and necessity, and which provides a natural way of describing conditional relationships between access rights. Modal logic also provides a convenient foundation for de ning abstract objects and types formed out of the primitive objects and types appearing in a deductive database. We e n visage that the latter may p r o ve to be important g i v en the large number of facts we m ust deal with and the potential need to construct a mapping between implementation and abstract security policy. The description of a real-world access control mechanism could involve a large number of facts, and modal logic is relatively simple and e cient to implement b y using existing tools.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we present a formal model of an access control mechanism which w e will use in providing a semantics to our logic. In Section 3 we describe the syntax, semantics and predicates of our logic. We s h o w that our modal logic can be transformed into rst order logic and implemented in Prolog. In Section 4 we de ne the inference rules of our logic, and introduce a number of queries which we used in experiments against a database of facts and inference rules of our logic. The queries were chosen to provide a suitable means of testing the implementation of our logic, and to illustrate its practical applicability. In Section 5 we describe experiments that involve an implementation of our logic in Prolog and the construction of a deductive database describing two real-world operating systems. The experiments demonstrate that our logic is computationally practical despite the large number of facts needed to describe a real-world operating system. In Section 6 we discuss an experiment w h e r e w e used a logic program to specify a security policy. We then illustrate how our techniques can be used to compare the con guration of an access control mechanism with such a policy. Finally, in Section 7, we p r e s e n t our conclusions.
Basic theoretic results are deferred to an appendix.
Preliminaries
We n o w i n troduce a formal model of a discretionary access control mechanism (ACM) in a centralised operating system. Our model makes use of the nite state machine formulation of the Bell-LaPadula model 2] which itself incorporates Lampson's protection matrix 11]. We have a nite set, S, o f a c t i v e e n tities, called subjects, t ypically processes or programs in execution a nite set, O, of passive e n tities, called objects, typically les and a nite set, R, of access rights. A protection matrix comprises rows representing subjects and columns representing objects where an entry in the protection matrix, s o] R see 11] , indicates the set of access rights which subject s has to object o.
Rather than use a protection matrix in our model, we employ a set of triples, M O S R, The set F = O S R models all potential access requests to an ACM. At a n y point in time, a nite number of access rights will be invoked, and the set A M models this active or actual set of functionality.
We n o w i n troduce a de nition of a relation that will be used to model dependencies between triples in F. In Section 3 w e i n troduce the Prolog predicate needs to represent members of this relation, and which will form the basis for inferring dependencies between access rights.
De nition 2. An example of a request is a command entered by a user at a terminal, to execute a speci c program. For example, the command who entered at a UNIX terminal would be modelled as a request by the user process to execute the /bin/who le. The command ls /homes/mydir would be modelled as two requests, the rst being a request by t h e user process to execute ls. Assuming that request completed successfully, the second is a request by t h e ls process to read the /homes/mydir directory.
Since Q F we can use the deductive machinery of our logic consistently, whether we are reasoning about the relationship between a request and a set of triples, or the relationship between a triple and a set of triples. If there is no suitable triple, f 2 F, t h a t i s c o n venient for representing a g i v en request, then we can easily introduce a nonce triple into F to represent the request this may i n volve the introduction of a new element i n to either the set O or the set R.
De nition 2.3 For a given set F = O S R, the state of an operating system is given by the ordered triple k = ( F A M), where A M F, and k 2 K, the set of states of the operating system. A subject issues an invoke command for an access right when it attempts to access an object, and eventually, once it has nished with the object, it issues the desist command. In both events, the state, k, of the operating system is changed by the introduction or removal of a triple in the set A. The invoke command, when applied to a triple f 2 F, i n troduces f into A if, and only if, f 2 M.
State transitions that involve the introduction or removal of a given access right from M are modelled by t h e grant and revoke commands, respectively. Removing a triple f 2 M simultaneously removes that same triple from A if f 2 A. Thus f 2 A implies f 2 M. T h i s i s i n c o n trast to those real-world operating systems that check access rights only at the time when a le is opened. The set F S = faccept rejectg is the set of outputs. A sequence of elements (c f) 2 C F, represents a computation of the operating system and forms the input string. A sequence of elements f s 2 F S forms the output string. The computation completes successfully if, and only if, the output string is a sequence of \accept"s.
The Multics kernel project, which sought to improve the security of the Multics operating system, identi ed a number of important dependencies between objects in an operating system 23]. Of these dependencies, naming and object typing are relevant to access control, but in this paper we deal only with naming. We h a ve d e v eloped a more elaborate form of our logic, involving various aspects of object-orientation, in which object typing is a central theme. We will present t h i s w ork in a future publication.
We d o n o t w ant to clutter our logic with unnecessary devices for operating upon complex names, nor do we w i s h t o e m bed thesyntax of any particular naming system in our logic. Therefore, we introduce only a simple naming scheme that can serve as the basis for modelling more sophisticated naming schemes. In the following de nition we m a k e use of the Kleene star notation (*) indicating the concatenation of 0 or more strings from a language 13].
De nition 2.4 Let 0 = fa : : : z A : : : Z 0 : : : 9g and 1 be the set of separator symbols.
We de ne the set of names to be , w h e r e = 0 1 .
Every memberofO, the set of objects, is uniquely identi ed with a name. The following de nition introduces the concept of a binary relation over names, which w e will use to represent a hierarchy of objects in O.
De nition 2.5 We de ne a digraph G = ( O E), whose nodes are the members of O and whose directed edges (arcs) belong to the set E O O. It is assumed hereafter that every node in G (except the root) has exactly one direct parent. Hence (x y) 2 E if and only if x 2 O, y 2 O, x 6 = y, a n d x is the direct parent of y in the name space o f a r eal-world operating system. Example 2.1 Let O = f\= 00 \=a 00 \=aa 00 \=aa=b 00 g and E = f(\= 00 \=a 00 ) (\= 00 \=aa 00 ) (\=aa 00 \=aa=b 00 )g: We observe that the interpretation of \/aa" r elative to \/a" is unambiguous because (\=a 00 \=aa 00 ) 2 E.
De nition 2.6 Let D = fF C M FS Q N R G g. Then D is the set of sets and relations constituting our formal model.
It is easy to see that D is nite and can be described by a string of nite length, because D comprises nite sets and (binary) relations over those sets.
The Logic Framework
We use the modal logic system S5 as a basis for our logic of access control and demonstrate that it can be transformed into a proper subset of rst-order logic. We e m p l o y certain restrictions to our logic which ensure that its transformation (into rst order logic) is Turing computable and that e cient implementation through logic programming tools is feasible 26]. Speci cally we a void the use of function variables we h a ve a nite domain of discourse and a nite number of predicates we adopt the Closed World Assumption (CWA), whereby a n y facts not explicitly stated as true are assumed to be false. In particular, any triples not explicitly granted are assumed to be forbidden we a void the use of disjunctive assertions and rules and restrict ourselves to Horn clauses and positive ground literals (facts) The elements of our logic are given below.
Connectives -negation (), conjunction (^) and implication ( ) of classical propositional calculus
Constants -members of the sets O, S and R Variables -range over the sets in the domain of discourse. The variables o, s, r, q, subscripted or otherwise, range over the sets O, S, R and Q, respectively, and the variables x, y and z range over the set F.
A term is either a variable or a constant. A term that contains no variables is a ground term. Where a term stands for a variable, the variable is assumed to be universally quanti ed over the entire formula. A predicate form is the application of the appropriate number of terms to a predicate constant of arity, s a y k, denoted by P(t 1 : : : t k ).
An atom is a predicate form. An atom containing no variables is a ground atom or a fact.
A literal is an atom or the negation thereof. A literal that contains the connective : is a negative literal, otherwise it is a positive literal.
We assume the rule of modus ponens. Namely, i f L and K L are theorems, then so is K.
The modal logic system S5
We graft modal elements onto our rst order logic to form the system S5.
The characteristic axiom L 2L of modal logic, where the monadic operator 2 is read \necessarily". If L is an atom, then so is 2L, a n d i f L is a literal, then so is 2L.
The axiom 23L 3L which c haracterises S5, where the monadic operator 3 is read as \possibly". It is de ned in terms of 2 through the equivalence 3L : 2:L. Informally this can be interpreted as,\something is possibly true i it is not necessarily false". We do not make explicit use of the operator 3 in the remainder of this paper.
A formula is recursively de ned as follows:
{ all literals are formulae { if L and K are formulae, then so are L^K and L K { if L is a formula, then so is 2L.
We make the following two observations. 
Semantics of modal logic
The semantics of modal logics do not permit a simple mapping onto the domain fT Fg. In particular, the interpretation of the formula, 2L, i s t h a t L is necessarily true.
An e ective basis for giving an interpretation to modal formulae is with reference to Kripke's notion of possible worlds 26]. Intuitively, the notion of possible worlds is that there can be several possible interpretations of a formula, each of which is said to occur in a particular world (or point).
The set W of possible worlds is called the universe, and an accessibility relation AR W W is de ned over the universe.
The semantics of S5 are given with reference to an S5-model M(W A R D V ), where W is a non-empty u n i v erse of possible worlds AR is an equivalence relation over W (thus ensuring the validity o f t h e c haracteristic axioms
D is a (non-empty, nite) domain of discourse V is a value-assignment (see below). We d e n e a value-assignment, V , as follows:
for each k-ary predicate, P, V (P ) D k W is a set of (k + 1)-tuples, (d 1 : : : d k w ), with w 2 W, which are assigned the value T for the predicate P. V assigns a truth value to each atom P(t 1 : : : t k ), not preceded by the operator 2, a t e a c h w orld w 2 W, as follows: V (P (t 1 : : : t k ) w ) = T i (V (t 1 ) : : : V (t k ) w ) 2 V (P ) V assigns a truth value to every formula as follows:
where L and K are formulae.
We observe t h a t V gives the truth value of a f o r m ula at a particular point w 2 W, and we write M w L, which is read as \for the S5-model M formula L is true in world w".
We restrict our attention to the truth value of a formula, L, at the particular point wa2 W which we use to denote the actual world. For the sake of simplicity, we will write M L as shorthand for M wa L. (This is an abuse of the standard notation, where M L means that L is T at all worlds in the universe.)
Given an S5-model, M(W A R D V ), and a nite set of formulae, , we s a y M is a w-model of i f M w L for all L 2 . From now o n , g i v en a set of formulae, , which w e write in the context of the actual world wa2 W, w e concern ourselves with a wa-model whose value-assignment is the set of all ground atoms which are a logical consequence of . We will refer to this as the intended model for .
Example 3.1 Consider the set of formulae fP(X) 2Q(X) 2Q(a)g and de ne W = fwa wng, and AR = f(wa wa) (wa wn) (wn wn) (wn wa)g. (wnrepresents a world which is distinct from the actual world wa.) In our intended m o del, the valuation, V , is given by V (Q) = fQ(a wa) Q (a wn)g = fQ(a) 2Q(a)g and V (P ) = fP(a wa)g = fP(a)g in accordance with an intuitive interpretation of the logical consequences of the formulae.
(We observe that M 2 wn P(X) 2Q(X), w h e r e V is as de ned in the preceding paragraph, illustrating that our intended m o d e l i s n o t a w n -m o del.)
De nition 3.1 Let be a nite set of formulae in our modal logic and let K be the set of constants in . We de ne K to be the nite set of all ground atoms that can be c onstructed using the modal operator 2 and the predicates and constants appearing in .
We note that the value-assignment i n t h e i n tended model for can be thought of as a subset of K . (That is, if V (P (t 1 : : : t k ) w ) = T for all w such t h a t ( wa w) 2 AR, w e i d e n tify this with 2P(t 1 : : : t k ) 2 K a n d i f V (P (t 1 : : : t k ) w a ) = T we i d e n tify this with P(t 1 : : : t k ) 2 K as in the preceding example.)
De nition 3.2 Let be a nite set of formulae, and let W be a nite set of worlds. Given a value-assignment, I, the consequence o p erator, I C: P( K ) ! P ( K ), where P( K ) denotes the power set of K , i s d e n e d b y I C (I) = fL : L L 1^: : : L k is a ground instance of a formula in fL 1 : : : L k g Ig We observe informally that I Cextends a given value-assignment, I, for the predicates in to include facts that can be inferred from I and the formulae in .
De nition 3.3 We de ne I 0 = and I n = I C (I n;1 ).
Appendix I presents formal results regarding the existence and uniqueness of a xpoint, I N , of the operator I C . I N represents the set of logical consequences of the set of formulae at the actual world.
Example 3.2 Using our previous example we have I 0 = I 1 = f2Q(a)g I 2 = fQ(a) 2Q(a) P (a)g = I 3 = :
We observe that:
Q(a) is entered into I 2 since 2L L is an axiom in S5 I 2 is a xpoint.
From Modal Logic to First Order Logic
We will want to render our nite set of formulae, , in rst order logic so as to use logic programming tools such as Prolog or Datalog. The following theorem states that such a translation is feasible. W is nite, can be t r ansformed i n p olynomial time into , a set of formulae in classical rstorder predicate logic.
Proof: Following Levene and Loizou 12], we describe a transformation from a nite set of formulae of our modal logic to a set of formulae of rst-order predicate logic.
Given the set of worlds W A = fwa w 1 : : : w p g W, where (wa w i ) 2 AR for all i, 1 6 i 6 p, the transformation is de ned as follows.
We i n troduce constants wa and w i , 1 6 i 6 p, i n to to represent t h e w orlds in W A . We assume that we can name these constants in such a w ay that they do not already appear in . Replace the head of each rule (including atomic formulae which can be regarded as rules with no bodies) in as follows:
{ if the rule has the form P(t 1 : : : t k ) L, w h e r e L is the body of the rule, replace it It is easy to verify that this transformation requires polynomial time in the size of the size of W A and the number of predicates in .
Our transformation preserves the validity of theorems in with respect to the intended model M. This is a special case of a result due to Morgan 18] . We n o w simplify the transformation into rst order logic by reducing the size of our universe of worlds. We note that to make meaningful use of the modal operator 2, w e require that we can distinguish between the semantics of L and 2L at the world wa2 W. The query ?2P (X), for example, is replaced b y ?P (X wa)^P(X wn) which fails as a rst order logic query in our transformed l o gic.
De nition 3.5 We de ne , a deductive database, to be a nite set of formulae describing an access control mechanism. The set is the union of a set E of ground positive facts and a set I of inference rules 13].
The Logical Language
In this section we present the predicates and inference rules of our logic, and a number of queries posed to our deductive database = E I . For paedagogical reasons we will present the predicates and inference rules of our logic as a classical rst-order predicate logic in the rst instance, to which w e will later add the modal operator 2 where appropriate.
Predicates
In Table 2 we introduce the predicates of our language, with reference to the formal model of Section 2. The column labelled \Semantics" states necessary and su cient conditions for the predicate to be true. 
The needs predicate is transitively closed under the following rule.
needs(x z) needs(x y)^needs(y z)
The following rules infer the set of object names searched when resolving an object's name, o 1 
We de ne the effective predicate as follows. 
Finally, w e de ne the lacks predicate as follows.
lacks(q 1 q 2 ) requires(q 1 q 2 ): (have(q 2 ))
In other words, (8) states that a request is e ective if there are no access rights that the request needs which are not granted. The CWA states that any facts which are not speci cally stated to be true are assumed to be false, and is adopted in logic programming systems such as Prolog, where a negative ground literal :x is inferred whenever a positive ground literal x cannot be deduced from the given facts in E . In general, the CWA can only be applied consistently to databases that contain ground positive literals and Horn clauses 14]. Further, negations in the body of an inference rule may lead to an inconsistent theory when the CWA is employed, because we may infer that a fact is true under the CWA, and then introduce a new fact that is the negation of the inferred fact 26]. The inference rules given in (8) and (9) di er from the earlier inference rules in that a negative literal appears in the body of each r u l e . In the speci c case of our logic this does not lead to inconsistency because the negative literals, :have and needs, are neither expressed as facts nor explicitly inferred by a n y of the inference rules neither effective nor :effective are ever expressed as facts. In some operating systems, one type of access right m a y imply another, for example, \write" 2 R may implicitly grant \ append" 2 R. Such cases can be accommodated by including rules like (10) below. Ta b l e 6 o n p a g e 1 5 s h o ws the inference rules for the Windows NT operating system. have((n s append)) have((n s write)) (10) In Table 3 we summarise the predicates and inference rules of our language.
Queries
We n o w de ne a number of standard queries which w e used in our experiments and which o p e r a t e against a database, , of facts and inference rules of our logic. We will write the de nitions of our queries in the syntax of Prolog thus we u s e t h e s y m bolso, s and r to stand for constants in the sets O, S and R, respectively, and we use the symbols O, S and R to refer to variables over the aforesaid sets. Hereafter we use the placeholder, W, to indicate modality in a query, on the understanding that wa or wn, as appropriate, would be substituted for W at query time. The queries are de ned below with respect to the current state, M, of the access control mechanism, ACM. To obtain the set of requests that would necessarily complete successfully (in other words, all possible triples that a request may need are granted):
To obtain the set of requests that would not necessarily complete successfully:
?effective((O S R) w n ): To obtain the set of triples that must be granted in M in order for a given request, (o s r), to complete successfully:
?requires((o s r) (O S R) W ):
To determine the set of requests which require a given triple:
?request((O S R) W ) requires((o s r) (O S R) W ):
To determine the set of triples whose absence is preventing the successful completion of a given request, (o s r),
?lacks((o s r) (O S R) W ): To determine the set of requests that would fail were a given triple, (o s r), revoked:
?
request((O S R) w n ) effective((O S R) w a ) requires((O S R) (o s r) w n ):
We note that it is not possible to infer facts concerning the revocation of a triple which is possibly required by a request that possibly completes successfully there is no way to determine whether there are circumstances in which the request can complete successfully without attempting to invoke that triple.
Prolog Implementation
We discuss the Prolog implementation of our rst order language using an example. Assume that the following segment of code forms part of a UNIX shell script stored in a le named =test1=test:sh. By construction, this script will always attempt to read the le =test1=message (line 1), will possibly attempt to write into the le =test1=gt (line 3), and will possibly attempt to write into the le =test1=le (line 4). In other words, a request, q 2 Q, w h e r e q is a triple granting the right to execute the le =test1=test:sh, necessarily requires triples to execute the cat program and to read from the le =test1=message, possibly requires a triple to write into the le =test1=gt De ning a Prolog rule of the form P(t 1 : : : t n w a ) : ; P(t 1 : : : t n w n ) for each predicate, P, i s a n alternative, and more economical, way o f e n tering the facts P(t 1 : : : t n w n ) a n d P( and subsequently need only enter have(x wn) a n d have(y wn), to enable us to infer have(x wa) and have(y wa). That is, in general we can represent k necessary (modal) facts for a given predicate using (k+1) instead of 2k rst order facts. The modal facts above can then be expressed in Prolog as follows.
request((O S R) w a ) : ; request((O S R) w n ):
request((=test1= t e s t : s h S e x e c u t e w n )):
needs((O1 S 1 R 1) (O2 S 2 R 2) w a ) : ; needs((O1 S 1 R 1) (O2 S 2 R 2) w n ):
needs((=test1=test:sh S execute) (=bin=cat S execute) w n ): needs((=test1=test:sh S execute) (=test1=message S read) w n ): needs((=test1=test:sh S execute) (=test1=gt S write) w a ): needs((=test1=test:sh S execute) (=test1=le S write) w a ):
Experimentation
We performed some experiments to demonstrate that our logic is practical to implement and that it can be applied to a real-world operating system. As a result of these experiments, we i n troduced a n umber of important features to our logic. Our experimentation made use of the UNIX operating system produced by the Santa Cruz Operation Ltd (SCO) and the Windows NT operating system produced by Microsoft 5, 25] . Both operating systems are designed to meet the security requirements of level C2 of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 2], as a result of which they both feature security audit trails from which w e obtained many of the facts for our deductive database.
Our approach w as to obtain a set of ground facts from each operating system using an assortment of imperative programs, and to present these facts to Prolog. For these experiments we did not attempt to describe in Prolog the speci c implementation details of either operating system, such as groups or the syntax and semantics of access control lists 22].
The rst task was to produce an implementation of our logic in a suitable programming language. We chose to use Prolog for our experiments because it is well known, it is su cient for our purposes and because interpreters for Prolog are available from a variety of sources. The interpreter that we used was the MS-DOS version of the SB-Prolog System, version 3.1, from the University of Arizona 6] . This is a rather modest system, but it proved to be adequate for the purposes of our experiments.
A n umber of additional predicates were introduced in the Prolog encoding for implementation reasons, for example, in order to avoid looping when the Prolog interpreter encountered recursive inference rules. Overall we found that it was straightforward to implement our logic in Prolog.
Our rst experiment w as performed on an instance of the SCO UNIX operating system, comprising 25 users and 22 user groups. This experiment had three objectives. First, to establish the practicality of dealing with the number of facts required to describe a real-world operating system. (In general, we suspect that automated construction of a deductive database is essential to the practical application of our approach.) Second, to discover a way of obtaining facts directly from a UNIX le system. Third, to apply our logic to some real-world computations.
Initially, we used a UNIX script program to output the set of parent of facts for the SCO UNIX le system, and a C program to output the entire set of have facts for a SCO UNIX raw disk device. This resulted in 7,555 parent of facts and 222,802 have facts, which w as beyond the capacity of the SB-Prolog interpreter. We therefore discarded any facts pertaining to subjects and objects other than those that were actually used in the course of our experiment.
We performed a numberofcontrolled activities on the SCO UNIX operating system, for which the corresponding set of needsand request facts were obtained from the security audit trail. From these we obtained the set of subject and object names, and generated a set of parent offacts. Only seven subject names appeared in the facts. We n e x t obtained the set of havefacts for the objects in question using a C program whose input consisted of a list of object names and whose output was the set of triples granted for each object. Any havefacts that referred to subjects other than the seven above were deleted. (Our database did not contain any requestfacts for these subjects, and we w ere inferring needed triples with reference to speci c requests.) Further, all havefacts associated with the UNIX root account w ere deleted, and replaced instead by a s i n g l e rule saying that the root subject has every possible type of access right t o e v ery object.
The number of facts obtained is shown in Table 4 below. We observe that the number of possible havefacts increases polynomially as users (and, similarly, objects or access rights) are added to the operating system. The sets of facts plus the Prolog inference rules formed our Table 4 : Numb e r o f F acts in Deductive Database deductive database. We experienced some minor problems when we rst ran our queries, such a s a recursive needs fact relating the object \/" to itself which caused the Prolog interpreter to loop. However, these problems were all easy to identify and straightforward to correct.
Some of the answers to the queries were unexpected in that they showed that some of our requests required triples which we had not expected, such as triples for keyboard and terminal character mapping les used by the UNIX shell command interpreter. This information might bene t a system administrator (and his or her users) who is contemplating revoking these triples and is unaware of their importance. Without this information, essential access rights might be revoked, leading to process failures.
The results of our rst experiment demonstrated that it is possible to implement our modal logic using a logic programming language, and that our logic succeeds in answering some questions of practical importance.
In order to investigate the generality of our logic, and the di culty of adapting it to a di erent type of operating system, we conducted a second experiment using Windows NT 21] . In this experiment we constructed a database describing the set of access rights required to run the commercial \Microsoft Word" word processing program against a set of les in an NTFS le system.
Most of the inference rules required for describing Windows NT could be copied from those describing SCO UNIX those that di ered are discussed below. There is no \root" user in Windows NT, so the inference rule referring to the root user was omitted. Table 5 indicates the abbreviations used for access rights supported by access control lists in Windows NT. Table 6 shows the inference rules describing relationships that hold between access rights in an NTFS le system 5, 25, 1 7 ] . These rules enable us to reduce the size of our database by omitting large numbers ofhave facts and inferring them instead from more \permissive" access rights.
x execute r read c change d delete w write p change properties o take ownership a all Table 5 We switched on audit trail recording, then launched and ran the word processor. As before, we obtained a set of request and needs facts by analysis of the security audit trail. There was insu cient information in the security audit trail to clearly distinguish a request fact from a needs fact consequently we had to add request facts to our database manually. With the SCO UNIX security audit trail we had been able to distinguish between request facts and needs facts by reconstructing the process tree, rooted at the login shell. This is a problem that could be easily overcome by adding further information to the security audit trail. Again our approach w as to obtain a set of ground have and parent of facts directly from the operating system, without modelling in Prolog the native Windows NT mechanisms such as object owner and subject groups. This is signi cant because the mechanisms used in Windows NT allow for the explicit declaration of denied access rights for both subjects and subject groups. The algorithm used by Windows NT for resolving any inconsistencies between permitted and denied access rights is highly specialised and imperative in nature. The restrictions placed on our logic, which ensure its e ciency, exclude negative facts, so that in fact we cannot describe the NT mechanisms directly in our logic. This presents no problem when we deal with ground have facts.
We used the perms program from the \Windows NT Resource Kit" to obtain the set of have facts and parent of facts. We then omitted any triples that could be inferred from the above rules, thereby reducing the numberofhave facts from 5072 to 2820.
Initially, our queries indicated that a signi cant n umber of triples were missing in respect of temporary les created by the Word program. The Word program deleted these les when it terminated, so the les did not exist at the time that we obtained our have facts. All of these les had very distinctive names, and we w ere able to account for them by i n troducing have facts that matched the name syntax of the temporary le names. Following this, our standard queries returned the expected results.
Overall, the e ort required in order to adapt our logic to the Windows NT operating system was not substantial. Most of the e ort was spent implementing simple programs for obtaining facts from Windows NT.
We recognise that further experimentation is required in order to assess the scalability of our approach. We h a ve already conducted experiments where le de nitions are used as Prolog facts and infer have and parent of facts from them, in an attempt to reduce the number of ground facts in the deductive database. A simple example is included in the next section, and further examples can be found in 4].
We also recognise that our techniques to generate needs facts are ad hoc and do not guarantee that all dependencies between access rights have been identi ed. Further work needs to be undertaken to establish whether, in fact, such a guarantee can be delivered, and, if so, how that might b e a c hieved.
6 Speci cation and veri cation of security policy A comprehensive review of speci cation and veri cation of security policies is found in 20], from which w e adopt the following de nition of an Access Control Policy (ACP). An ACP speci es those states of ACM that preserve certain desirable properties of information con dentiality, integrity and availability for the operating system in question.
In the ensuing de nition the notion of consistency is employed. In simple terms, the state, M, of an ACM is consistent with a given ACP if it satis es the requirements of that policy. For a formal treatment of this concept, the reader is referred to 4].
De nition 6.1 An o p erating system is in a secure state k = ( F A M) i M is consistent with the ACP given for that operating system. In such a case we also say that M i s a secure state of the ACM. We h a ve seen that a deductive database implemented in Prolog is capable of describing the ACM of a real-world operating system, and of reasoning about the e ects of an ACM on the computations performed by the operating system.
The overwhelming number of subjects, objects and types of access right i n a r e a l -w orld operating system means that a system administrator will not always fully appreciate the consequences of changing an ACM. Our results provide a basis for developing automated tools that are capable of describing, and reasoning about, such large numbers of facts, and hence improve the understanding of the implications of changing an ACM, and hence reducing the possibility of con guring an ACM in such a w ay as to compromise the corresponding ACP.
We n o w explore whether Prolog might p r o vide a suitable system for writing an ACP that could be used to determine whether an ACM described in our deductive database is in a secure state.
We demonstrate this via a simple example. Although various speci cation schemes for ACPs exist in the literature 20], we use Prolog clauses to specify our ACP and choose the UNIX operating system to provide an ACM since the semantics of its le permissions align closely to Prolog's negation-as-failure rule.
From our example we hope to gain some insight i n to the following issues.
How do the restrictions of Prolog limit its suitability for writing an ACP? How easy is it to write an abstract ACP in terms of real-world objects and operations, and to map the ACP onto a real-world access control mechanism? How readily can the speci cation of security g i v en in the ACP be used to verify whether a given state of an access control mechanism is a secure state? Our example concerns a university computer science department i n w h i c h the following activities must be supported.
A lecturer can set and mark examination papers in a variety of subjects. Papers and marks are written to les. A student can read examination papers, but not les containing marks. A student can submit an examination script (as a le) for marking if the student studies the course on which the paper is set. The following approach is adopted.
We write an abstract ACP in Prolog. It is intended that this should use, as far as possible, a natural (language) interpretation of the requirements of the ACP. The speci cation is abstract in the sense that the ACP is written without reference to the operating system which i s t o p r o vide the ACM. We describe the ACM implementation using Prolog to simulate a set of UNIX les, users and groups. We map requirements of the ACP onto requests of the form ( le, user, access right). A fuller account of this example and others can be found in 4]. We adopt the usual Prolog syntax where variable names start with an upper case letter, constant names with a lower case letter and lists are comma-separated and enclosed in square brackets. However, we omit the single quote delimiters for arbitrary constants in the interests of readability.
The following extract forms a typical part of our ACP speci cation. The person predicate is de ned by a list of facts specifying the users of the proposed le system, and takes three arguments -the name and status of the person, and a list of the courses with which the person is involved. The intended meaning of the above clause is that a person can sit an examination paper if (s)he is a student and studies the course for which the paper was set. The UNIX implementation is written in Prolog by expressing the UNIX accounts and les in the system as facts using the predicates, user def and file def. The former takes two arguments, the account n a m e and a list of groups to which that account belongs. The latter takes four arguments, the le name, its owner, its group owner and its permissions. The le permissions are written as a list in order to facilitate processing. Typical examples are shown below. (We assume that there is only one course, and that all material relating to that course is held in a sub-directory, =cs, of the root directory. The directories =papers, =scripts and =marks are sub-directories of the =cs directory.) user def(j c students]):
file def(=cs=papers root staff d r w x r w x r ; x ]):
We infer the have and needs facts directly from the le and user de nitions. (It was not felt necessary to explicitly create a deductive database of triples or to use our modal logic operator 2 for this example.)
We m a p t h e A CP onto the UNIX implementation using the predicate ait map. The approach that we adopt is to equate each action in the ACP with a set (represented as a list) of UNIX access rights. The extract below illustrates the code used.
ait map((cs Name mark) (=cs=scripts Acc r) (F i l e A c c r ) (=cs=marks Acc w)]) :; ais map(N ame Acc) c a n (cs Name mark) parent dir(=cs=scripts File): In this example, marking a script maps to requests to read the =cs=scripts directory, to read a le from that directory, and to write to the =cs=marks directory. The ais map predicate maps user names in the ACP onto UNIX accounts in the implementation. (The predicate names ais map and ait map are contractions of abstract-implementation-subject-map and abstract-implementationtriple-map, respectively.) The parent dir predicate is true if the rst argument is the parent directory of the second argument.
The above framework enables us to pose the following questions as Prolog queries: Q1 Which UNIX access rights need to be granted to implement the ACP? That is, which access rights need to be granted so that every request that can be inferred from the ait map predicate completes successfully? This query was constructed in order to provide an easy means of de ning the two f o l l o wing queries. Q2 Which o f t h e a b o ve access rights are not granted in a given state of the UNIX implementation? Q3 Which access rights granted in a given state of the UNIX implementation are not authorised by the ACP? That is, is our UNIX implementation in a secure state with respect to our ACP? The Prolog interpreter returned \no" in response to Q2 (that is, the implementation granted all the access rights required by the AC P ) a s w e expected. However, the interpreter did return non-empty responses to Q3. These were of two t ypes.
Access rights that allowed a student to read the script of another student. Presumably this would be undesirable, but it should be noted that the ACP does not preclude this possibility. That is, the ACP has been inadequately speci ed. Access rights that allowed a user read access to a directory. These instances are examples of the fact that read access to a directory in UNIX is equivalent t o l i s t a c c e s s . It does not actually convey any r i g h ts to access les in the directory. In particular, it is quite common to have execute access, but not read access, to a directory. This enables users to read (or write to) any les in the directory (that they know the name of) and to which t h e y h a ve read (or write) access, but prevents them from listing the contents of the directory 19]]. Thus our simple experiment raised the question \to which directories is it appropriate for users to have both read and execute access?" For example, it would be reasonable in the light o f o u r experiment, to restrict access to the /papers directory to execute only, and in \real life" for students to be given the path and lename for the paper they were required to sit. In summary, we generate a list of requests that our implementation must provide in order to support all the operations in the ACP, which i n t u r n g i v es rise to a set of access rights that are required for those requests to complete successfully. We c a n n o w analyse any access rights granted by the ACM that are not permitted by the ACP speci cation, and assess whether they arise as a result of incorrectly, or partially, specifying the ACP, incorrectly implementing the ACM, or indeed whether they are an unavoidable consequence of the shortcomings of the ACM mechanism provided. This example demonstrates that it is possible to specify an ACP using Prolog and, from our experience, indicates that doing so can draw attention to possible security weaknesses in the state of an ACM intended to implement that ACP. Prolog seems to provide a suitable means of specifying an ACP, and of describing an ACM in the UNIX operating system, given the similar restrictions of Prolog's negation as failure rule, and UNIX's denial of an access right i f i t is not explicitly granted.
Conclusions
We have described a modal logic that allows us to reason about the e ects of an ACM on the computations performed by an operating system. Experimentation has demonstrated that such a logic is practical to implement using existing tools and, moreover, for a reasonably large number of facts. These results establish an unexpected foundation for improving the e ectiveness of access control mechanisms, and thereby for improving operating system security, through the use of logic programming and deductive database technology.
There are numerous opportunities for further research. We believe that the existing formal foundations are su cient for practical experimentation to lead the way. The formalism will be extended where experimentation shows it to be necessary. Tools to support experimentation are readily available in the form of logic programming systems, and in any case we believe that more experimentation is desirable to establish the bene ts and limitations of the logic as currently formulated. We therefore intend to conduct experiments to investigate the use of our approach o n a v ariety of real-world operating systems. We are now considering extensions to our model that would enable us to examine:
distributed systems, where we w ould like to incorporate some of the ideas in the calculus for access control in distributed systems developed by A b a d i et al. 1] heterogeneous systems sharing a common ACP generic system administration activity role-based access control the management of sensitive c o m binations of access rights and explicit modelling of implementation details including object owner, groups and access control lists. Our experiment in Section 6 also raises several questions. Can we use our techniques on other platforms? For example, could we map the same ACP onto the ACM of a UNIX system and the ACM of Windows NT? Prolog, which does not support explicit negation, presumably prevents us from specifying some types of ACP, and di erent f o r m ulations will presumably be needed to cope with ACMs which support explicit denial of access rights. We a n ticipate that logic programming systems such as Datalog and applications of default logic may provide some solutions to these issues 3, 10]. We a n ticipate, however, that much m a y be gained from a better understanding of how m uch can be achieved using a Prolog-based implementation.
We e n visage that stronger concepts of object-orientation may also be required, together with some form of calculus operating upon object types, in order to facilitate the construction of mappings between an ACP and a deductive database. We are currently considering such extensions to the logic.
